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Chapter 4
Making the Most of 401 (kJ Plans:
Whos Choosing What and Why?
Robert L. Clark, Gordon P Goodfellow,
Sylvester J. Schieber, and Drew Warwick
Pension assets grew faster than total wealth in the United States during the
1980s, leading one researcher to conclude that "pensions are how America
saves" (Shoven 1995). At the same time that pension wealth has grown in
importance, there has been a revolution in the pension industry as defined
contribution plans in general, and 401 (k) plans in particular, have become
the pensions of choice. During the late 1970s, there were approximately
twice as many active participants in private defined benefit plans as in pri-
vate defined contribution plans. Today, the situation is almost exactly re-
versed. This shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension
plans has been accompanied by a shift in the responsibility for financing
and managing retirement accruals from firms to individuals. By the end of
the 1980s, three-fourths of the contributions going into private pension
plans went into defined contribution plans, and nearly half of these contri-
butions went into plans partly dependent on voluntary contributions by
workers. Projecting trends on pension contributions, the U.S. Department
of Labor (1997) concluded that it will not be long before more money is
going into private 401 (k) plans than all other private pension plans com-
bined, if we are not there already. Most of the contributions to these plans
will be directly from workers.
During the same period, there was a similar shift in the responsibility for
managing assets in employer-sponsored retirement plans. Defined benefit
plan sponsors assume the responsibility of managing the pension assets in
their retirement trusts, since they bear the risks associated with investment
performance of pension funds. Today, the overwhelming majority of work-
ers participating in 401 (k) plans (and their public and nonprofit sector
counterparts) are required to manage the investment of their retirement
savings directly. In this new world, not only do workers have to determine
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when to start saving for their retirement and how much to contribute to
their retirement accounts, they also have to decide the allocation of pension
funds across various types of assets.
Because of these fundamental changes in retirement plans and the impor-
tance of individual decision-making, we developed a new data file of the
participants in 87 401 (k) plans. This unique data file enabled us to examine
individual savings and investment choices associated with these plans. Specif-
ically, we examined who participated in these plans, how much they contrib-
uted when they did, and how they managed their assets as they accrued them.
We first describe the data file used in this analysis and present the charac-
teristics of the participants in the plans. Next, we assess the factors related to
participation and contribution rates in these plans, and then evaluate the
general level of assets being accumulated. The next step is to examine the
portfolio allocations and the associated characteristics of workers related to
variations in asset allocations. Finally, we look at how participation, contri-
bution rates, and asset allocations vary by the sex of the participants in
these plans.
Description of the Data
Our analysis of individual contribution and investment decisions in 401 (k)
plans was based on administrative records of 87 plans in operation during
1995. All information reported covered the 1995 calendar year. Of these
plans, 41 were administrative recordkeeping clients ofWatson Wyatt World-
wide; 46 were not. The smallest plan in the group had just under 25 partici-
pants, and the largest plan had approximately 15,000 participants. The
plans analyzed here were not chosen on a random probability basis, but
there is no reason to believe that the variation in characteristics of these
plans was dissimilar to that of 401 (k) plans generally.
A total of234,573 workers were employed at some time during 1995 by the
sponsors of these plans. Information for each worker included age, annual
pay, 1995 contributions to the 401 (k) plan, 1995 account balances, amount
of funds in each investment option provided by the plan sponsor, years of
service with the company, and employee's name.! Not all the employees
were included in the sample used in the analysis for a variety of reasons.
Workers under age 20 or over age 64 were omitted, as were part-year em-
ployees. Also eliminated were workers who did not have at least one year of
service, because some plans had a one-year-of-service participation stan-
dard. In addition, employees with annual earnings of less than $10,000 per
year were deleted from the sample, because we were interested in examin-
ing the behavior of full-time workers and the administrative records did not
include an hours measure that could be used for such screening. After these
deletions, the base file used in the analysis contained 156,376 workers eligi-
ble to participate in the 401 (k) plans in 1995.
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Utilization of 401 (kJ Plans
Since employee contributions to 401 (k) plans are voluntary, workers must
decide whether or not to designate a portion of pre-tax earnings as contri-
butions to the plan. In general, individuals are free to select any contribu-
tion amount from zero up to the maximum annual level specified by the
firm or the legal limit ($9,240 in 1995). In evaluating the effectiveness
of voluntary contributory retirement plans, analysts have been concerned
about variations in the participation and contribution rates in these plans by
workers at differen t levels ofannual earnings. Part of the policy concern is to
avoid providing higher-income workers a disproportionate share of the ad-
vantages of the preferential tax treatment afforded these plans.2 Of course,
there is also some interest in the potential of these plans to provide ade-
quate retirement security to a broad cross-section of workers. Earlier re-
search using similar data has concluded that the decision to participate in
these plans and the amounts contributed vary with plan characteristics and
with worker's age and earnings (Clark and Schieber 1998). That is where we
begin the current analysis.
Policymakers concerned about the growth of voluntary retirement plans
have also focused on the willingness of other specific groups of individuals
to participate in 401 (k) plans and on how the management of retirement
assets varies across socioeconomic groups. For example, some argue that
young people may not begin to save early enough or may save too little to
accumulate sufficient assets by the time they retire. Others believe that low-
wage workers and women might be overly risk averse and thus tend to invest
too conservatively. For these reasons, it is important to examine carefully the
investment choices of workers of different ages, sexes, and levels of earn-
ings. The age and earnings distribution of persons employed by the spon-
sors of these 87 plans is shown in Table 1. These data indicate that halfof the
entire sample had annual earnings of $15,000 to $34,999 in 1995 and an
additional third of the employees had earnings of between $35,000 and
$74,999. Younger workers were more likely to have had lower earnings - 82
percent earned less than $35,000 per year, while persons 40 to 59 years of
age were more likely to have had higher earnings.
Participation in 401 (k) Plans
Young, low-income workers were much less likely to participate in a 401 (k)
plan than older, high-income individuals. For example, fewer than halfofall
workers age 20-29 earning less than $15,000 per year contributed to their
401 (k) plan. In contrast, over 92 percent ofworkers aged 50 and older with
earnings in excess of $60,000 participated in their company plan. It is im-
portant to recognize that pension participation varies with both age and in-
come. Furthermore, it should be recognized that older workers were more
TABLE 1: Age and Earnings Distribution of Employees (%)
AnnualEarnings ($000)
Age group 10.0-14.9 15.0-24.9 25.0-34.9 35.0-44.9 45.0-59.9 60.0-74.9 75.0-99.9 100+
20-29 12.4 37.8 31.4 12.1 5.0 0.8 0.4 0.2
30-39 6.1 21.8 27.0 18.8 14.1 5.9 3.5 2.7
40-49 6.5 20.5 22.8 16.2 14.7 7.7 5.8 5.9
50-59 8.2 23.0 22.4 13.9 13.5 6.8 5.7 6.5
60-65 10.4 28.1 21.6 12.9 11.0 6.0 4.4 5.6
All ages 7.7 24.4 25.5 15.9 12.6 5.8 4.1 4.0
Source: Authors' calculations from a file containing data on 87 401 (k) plans and 156,376 persons employed by plan sponsors and eligible to
participate in the plans in 1995.
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likely to be participating in the pension plan than the average ofall workers.
This indicated that the number of people who will accumulate pension
accounts sometime during their life is greater than that shown by a single
cross-section of the proportion of workers who are participating in a plan
during that year.3
Table 2 reports the proportion of eligible workers who contributed to
their 401 (k) plans during 1995 by various ages and levels of annual earn-
ings. These data reveal important earnings and age patterns in the propor-
tion of earnings contributed to the 401 (k) plan. The effect of increases in
annual earnings on the likelihood that a worker will participate in the plan
was also clearly shown in these data. Only 60 percent of all workers with
annual earnings between $10,000 and $14,999 participated in the 401 (k)
plans, while approximately three quarters of those earning between $15,000
and $34,999 made contributions during 1995. Over 80 percent of workers
with annual earnings between $35,000 and $59,999 participated, and over
90 percent of those earning in excess of $60,000 made contributions. Hold-
ing age constant, the proportion of workers who participated in the plan in-
creased rapidly with income up to the earnings level of $60,000 to $74,999.
Further increases in income did not seem to affect participation.
Participation rates also rose with age, from 66 percent for those aged 20-
29 to 79 percent for 30-39-year-olds, and over 80 percent ofworkers aged 40
and over. This age-related increase in participation was much larger among
low-income workers. For most workers, their earnings increases as they age.
Therefore, a lifecycle pattern of participation is best viewed as a movement
along the diagonals of the table.
Multivariate statistical analysis of participation in a 401 (k) plan produced
estimates of the partial effects of earnings, age, and tenure on the proba-
bility of workers making contributions to their 401 (k) accounts in 1995.
Since the information in Table 2 suggested that these variables had a non-
linear effect, the estimated equation included age and age squared, tenure
and tenure squared, and earnings and earnings squared. In addition, the
equation included dichotomous variables indicating the worker's sex and a
series of dichotomous variables identifYing the 401 (k) plan in which the
person was enrolled.4
The estimated marginal effects indicated that the probability of participa-
tion in the plan increases with age, tenure, and earnings, but at a decreasing
rate. Given the nonlinearity of the relationships between participation and
age, tenure, and earnings level, the best method ofassessing their effects was
to plot the implied participation probabilities as age, tenure, and earnings
vary. Figure 1 shows the increase in the probability of 401 (k) participation
with increases in earnings for a hypothetical male worker age 40 and hav-
ing 10 years of tenure employed by the largest plan sponsor in our sample.5
The probability of 401 (k) participation for such a worker earning less than
$25,000 was approximately 55 percent, while a similar worker earning
TABLE 2: 401 (k) Participation Rates by Age and Earnings (%)
Annual Earnings ($000)
Age group 10.0-14.9 15.0-24.9 25.0-34.9 35.0-44.9 45.0-59.9 60.0-74.9 75.0-99.9 100+ AllEarnings
20-29 43.5 61.7 71.4 79.5 86.3 91.3 91.0 91.1 66.2
30-39 59.3 71.5 76.6 81.2 87.7 91.3 93.6 89.0 78.6
40-49 63.7 76.0 78.8 81.8 86.1 90.3 92.0 89.2 81.1
50-59 73.8 81.5 82.4 85.0 87.8 92.9 95.1 92.3 84.7
60-65 75.9 82.0 80.9 84.9 90.5 96.6 93.1 92.4 84.4
All ages 59.6 72.1 77.1 81.8 87.2 91.4 93.2 90.2 78.6
Source: See Table 1.
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Figure 1. 401 (k) participation rates for men by earnings (%), Values are based on the
logit regression in column 2, Appendix Table 1. Values are for employees of the
largest plan sponsor, age 40, with 10 years tenure.
$75,000 had a participation probability of about 60 percent. Participation
rates for men with annual earnings of $125,000 exceeded 65 percent. The
estimation procedure constrained the participation probabilities for women
to have the same relationship with increases in annual earnings as that
shown for men in Figure 1; however, the probability of participation was
predicted to be about 2 percentage points higher at each level of income.
The effects of advancing age and tenure on 401 (k) participation proba-
bilities are shown in Figure 2 for two different earnings levels, $25,000 and
$75,000. In this case, the profiles are for a man hired by the firm at age 30;
thus as age increases by one year, so does tenure, The profiles show that the
probability of participation in the plan at age 30 was just under 50 percent
for men earning $25,000, and about 53 percent for those with $75,000.
These probabilities rose slightly with age until the mid-40s and then de-
clined. The predicted participation rates for women had the same age pat-
tern as that shown in Figure 2, they were slightly higher at each age.
An alternative specification used to examine the participation decision
introduced two company-specific pension variables that were expected to
influence whether a worker would participate in the 401 (k) plan. Specifi-
cally, we hypothesized that a worker will be more likely to make a contribu-
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Figure 2. 401(k) participation rates for men by age and earnings (%). Values are
based on the logit regression in column 2, Appendix Table 1. Values are for em-
ployees hired at age 30 by the largest plan sponsor, with either $25,000 or $75,000
annual earnings.
tion to the plan when the company provides a matching contribution, and
the higher the match rate, the more likely a worker will be to participate in
the plan. We also argue that the existence of a company defined benefit
plan will influence 401 (k) participation. Hence, we asked whether the pro-
jected age-65 replacement rate from the defined benefit plan affects the
likelihood that a worker will make a contribution to the 401 (k) plan.6 The
individual 401 (k) plan indicators were not included in this specification of
the participation equation.
The estimates indicate that workers were, in fact, more likely to partici-
pate in the 401 (k) plan the higher the company match rate. The estimated
effects indicated that each 10 percentage point increase in the match rate
increased the probability of 401 (k) participation by 3 percentage points.
This finding is consistent with workers responding to the economic incen-
tive of a higher return on their own investment when the match is included
(Clark and Schieber 1998). The estimated effects of a higher defined bene-
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fit replacement rate indicated that a 10 percentage point higher projected
rate at age 65 reduced the probability of participating in the 401 (k) plan by
0.4 percentage points. This finding suggested that workers had a target level
of retirement savings in mind when they decided whether to participate in
these plans, so that employees covered by more generous defined benefit
plans desired to save less in their 401 (k) plans.
Contribution Rates by 40 J (kJ Participants
Annual employee contributions as a percent ofsalary are shown in Table 3 by
various age and earnings groups. The entries indicate the average percent-
age ofearnings contributed to the plan by those workers who made a contri-
bution during 1995. The table also reports combined employee and em-
ployer annual contributions. For all participants with annual earnings under
$45,000, employee contributions were between 6 and 7 percent ofearnings,
while combined contributions represented about 10 percent of compensa-
tion. For workers earning $45,000-$99,999, employee contributions totaled
7-8 percent of earnings, and combined contributions amounted to 11-12
percent. Finally, contributions as a percent of earnings were lower for per-
sons earning in excess of$100,000. The decline in the contribution rate for
highly compensated workers was presumably driven by the maximum contri-
bution rates imposed by the company and/ or the tax code.
Among those workers contributing to a plan, age effects were greater
than the earnings effects described above. The contribution rates increased
with age for all workers and within each income category. Participants age
20-29 contributed 5 percent of their earnings, while those age 30-39 con-
tributed almost 7 percent. The contribution rate continued to increase with
age, as persons age 50-59 contributed 8 percent of earnings and those age
60-65 contributed 9 percent.
A multivariate analysis of contribution rates enables us to determine how
these rates vary with age, tenure, earnings, sex, and dichotomous variables
indicating the plan in which the person was enrolled (see the first two
columns ofAppendix Table 2).7 The analysis of contribution rates included
only persons who made a contribution in 1995 to their 401 (k) plan. The
results show that contributions as a percent of pay were flat up to the
$65,000 earnings level. Above $65,000, discrimination limits and dollar cap
limits imposed by the tax code reduced contribution rates relative to work-
ers' pay.
Figure 3 plots the interacting effects of age and tenure on the probability
of men participating in a 401 (k) plan, derived from the same multivari-
ate analysis. The values were calculated for a 401 (k) participant earning
$40,000 per year, who was hired at age 30. The combined effects of increas-
ing age and tenure on the contribution rate to the plan were strongly posi-
TABLE 3: 401 (k) Contribution Rates by Age and Earnings (% ofAnnual Earnings)
AnnualEarnings ($000)
AgegrfYUp 10.0-14.9 15.0-24.9 25.0-34.9 35.0-44.9 45.0-59.9 60.0-74.9 75.0-99.9 100+ AllEarnings
Emplayee contributions as a percentage ofearnings
20-29 4.4 4.4 4.9 6.1 6.8 7.5 5.6 4.2 5.0
30-39 6.4 6.4 6.1 6.5 7.2 7.5 7.2 5.5 6.6
40-49 7.5 7.3 6.6 6.8 7.3 7.6 7.4 5.9 7.0
50-59 8.2 9.1 8.1 8.1 8.3 8.4 7.6 6.0 8.2
60-65 9.3 10.4 8.9 9.2 9.4 8.8 7.9 5.6 9.2
All ages 6.9 6.9 6.4 6.9 7.5 7.8 7.4 5.8 6.9
Emplayee contributions plus emplayer match as a percentage ofearnings
20-29 6.8 7.6 8.5 9.6 10.5 10.9 8.1 5.7 8.4
30-39 9.6 9.9 9.7 10.1 11.1 11.5 11.1 8.2 10.2
40-49 10.7 10.9 10.2 10.2 11.1 11.5 11.5 9.2 10.6
50-59 11.4 13.0 12.0 11.8 12.2 12.2 11.7 9.3 12.0
60-65 12.1 14.5 13.3 12.7 13.5 13.0 11.7 8.5 13.1
All ages 9.9 10.4 10.1 10.4 11.3 11.7 11.4 8.9 10.5
Source: See Table 1.
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Figure 3. 401 (k) contribution rates for men by age (as % of annual pay). Values are
based on the OLS regression shown in column 2, Appendix Table 2. Values are for
employees hired at age 30 by the largest plan sponsor, with annual earnings of
$40,000.
tive, with contributions rising from 5 percent to 8 percent between age 30
and age 60.
We also developed an alternative specification of the contribution rate
equation that included the 401 (k) match rate and the level of generosity of
the defined benefit plan where there was one. The results are shown in the
third and fourth columns ofAppendix Table 2. The negative coefficient on
the match rate provided further support for the target saving hypothesis.
The estimated coefficient indicates that each 10 percentage point increase
in the match rate was associated with a reduction in the contribution rate of
0.4 percentage points. In this equation, the replacement rate from the de-
fined benefit plan had a positive effect on the 401 (k) contribution rate, was
at odds with the target savings model. This finding is, however, consistent
with Ippolito's (1997) hypothesis of saving preferences. This model predicts
that workers with high saving preferences will want both defined benefit and
defined contribution retirement savings plans. The coefficient indicated
that each 10 percentage point increase in the projected replacement rate
from the defined benefit plan increased the contribution rate by 2 percent-
age points.
TABLE 4: Average Account Balance by Age and Earnings
AnnualEarnings ($000)
Age group 10.0-14.9 15.0-24.9 25.0-34.9 35.0-44.9 45.0-59.9 60.0-74.9 75.0-99.9 100+ AllEarnings
--
Balancesfrom employee contributions
20-29 1,258 2,128 3,646 6,811 10,862 15,000 13,444 14,799 4,026
30-39 2,802 4,238 7,003 11,423 17,813 26,875 34,106 43,745 12,411
40-49 4,661 6,234 9,804 16,726 25,755 39,919 52,644 73,109 21,884
50-59 6,811 9,759 15,677 26,221 38,689 55,534 71,594 117,054 32,145
60-65 8,290 14,442 20,908 30,732 46,830 64,523 80,600 145,358 36,082
All ages 4,184 5,711 8,920 15,276 24,673 38,700 51,945 81,367 18,562
Total balances
20-29 2,200 3,907 6,781 11,881 18,783 23,834 19,810 21,928 7,169
30-39 5,328 7,539 12,762 20,454 30,905 44,944 55,993 68,937 21,409
40-49 8,226 10,974 17,461 29,131 44,731 65,955 89,316 121,279 37,359
50-59 11,304 16,506 26,430 42,934 63,941 88,733 119,121 202,854 53,770
60-65 13,081 23,318 34,391 50,655 78,417 103,810 123,932 239,431 58,797
All ages 7,250 9,908 15,731 26,342 42,168 63,413 86,537 136,447 31,511
Source: See Table 1.
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Investment Patterns of 401 (k' Assets
Participating in a 401 (k) plan and contributing reasonable amounts to the
plan play an extremely important role in determining the amount ofmoney
that these plans will produce for retirement income purposes. Thus, it is
important to examine retirement fund balances attributable to employee
contributions as well as total 401 (k) accumulations. Table 4 reports the
401 (k) account balances of all workers who had contributed to one of the
sample plans in the past (even though they might not have done so during
1995).8 Not surprisingly, Table 4 reveals a strong relationship between earn-
ings, age, and 401 (k) plan balances. In the bottom three earnings classes,
which include workers with earnings up to $35,000 per year, the average
cumulative total balances in the plans were roughly equal to one-half a year's
earnings. Average account balances rose steadily with increases in earn-
ings until they approached annual earnings for workers earning between
$75,000 and $100,000. Fund balances across different age groups varied
significantly with earnings. For example, accumulated balances of workers
in their mid-60s with earnings up to $25,000 were roughly 6 times those of
workers in their 20s with similar earnings. For those earning $35,000 to
$75,000, the differential for these age groups dropped to only 4 times. At
earnings levels above $75,000, the differential ranged from 8 to 10 times.
To examine the investment choices of plan participants, the 87 firms were
divided into two groups, depending on whether the 401 (k) plan offered
company stock as an investment option in the plan. In our sample of plans,
58 did not offer company stock as an investment option for plan partici-
pants, and 29 companies did. Plans with company stock options employed
one of three types of investment options: 16 plans simply offered company
stock as an investment option that participants could invest in if they so
chose without any incentives or requirements that they do so; 9 plans con-
tributed matching contributions only to the company stock account and
allowed plan participants free choice as to whether they wanted to invest
their own contributions in company stock; and 4 plans required that em-
ployee contributions be made to the company stock account in order to
qualifY for matching employer contributions that also went to the company
stock account.
Focusing first on the 58 plans without any company stock investment
option, Table 5 reports the proportion of total 1995 contributions allocated
to the purchase of equities and fixed-income assets. Two consistent patterns
emerge from these data. First, the proportion of contributions allocated to
fixed-income assets increased with age. The proportion of new contribu-
tions devoted to fixed-income assets increased from approximately 43 per-
cent for workers under age 40 to about 55 percent for participants age 50
and older. The increase in fixed assets with age was observed within each of
the earnings categories. Second, as annual earnings increased, the propor-
TABLE 5: Allocation of 401 (k) Contributions by Age and Earnings; 401 (k) Plans without Company Stock as an Investment
Option (%)
AnnualEarnings ($000)
Age group 10.0-14.9 15.0-24.9 25.0-34.9 35.0-44.9 45.0-59.9 60.0-74.9 75.0-99.9 100+ AllEarnings
Percent ofcontributions in equities
20-29 53 53 59 63 68 68 69 74 58
30-39 46 49 54 61 63 67 70 75 57
40-49 46 48 47 56 58 60 64 70 54
50-59 38 42 43 49 53 57 58 66 47
60-65 37 35 37 43 45 58 51 61 41
All ages 45 48 50 57 60 62 64 70 54
Percent ofcontributions in fixed-income assets
20-29 47 47 41 37 32 32 31 26 42
30-39 54 51 46 39 37 33 30 25 43
40-49 54 52 53 44 42 40 36 30 46
50-59 62 58 57 51 47 43 42 34 53
60-65 63 65 63 57 55 42 49 39 59
All ages 55 52 50 43 40 38 36 30 46
Source: Authors' calculations. Allocations are calculated only for employees making a contribution in 1995. Plan information is from a file
containing data on 58 401 (k) plans that did not provide the option of investing in company stock.
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tion of new contributions designated for the purchase of fixed-income assets
declined. Workers with annual earnings under $35,000 allocated slightly
more than halftheir contributions to fixed-income assets, while individuals
with earnings in excess of $60,000 put only 30 to 40 percent of their contri-
butions in fixed-income accounts.
Among participants in the 29 plans that offered or required some pur-
chase of company stock, we found that these workers designated much less
of their 401 (k) contributions to fixed-income assets (33 percent in Table 6
compared to 46 percent in Table 5). This was true for each of the age / earn-
ings entries shown in the two tables. The first panel ofTable 6 shows that low
earners (those with earnings between $10,000 and $15,000) allocated 38
percent of their contributions to company stock; at earnings of $15,000 to
$25,000 the share contributed to company stock dropped to 28 percent; and
it peaked at 41 percent for those earning $45,000 to $60,000. The propor-
tion ofcontributions devoted to company stock declined slightly at earnings
levels over $75,000. In general, the proportion ofcontributions allocated to
company stock rose with age until 50 to 59, and then declined.
We also examined summary investment information for 401 (k) aggregate
account balances reported in Table 7. The data show that the individual
portfolio composition of account balances was remarkably close to the allo-
cation of 1995 contributions. Workers with earnings in excess of $15,000
held less of their 401 (k) balances in fixed-income assets as annual earnings
increased. Also, workers without a company stock investment option consis-
tently put 10 to 15 percentage more oftheir 401 (k) contributions and total
account balances in fixed-income asset accounts, as compared to those with
a company stock option.
To clarify how the availability of company stock as an investment option
affected 401 (k) asset allocations between equities and fixed-income assets,
we estimated Tobit equations (reported in Appendix Tables 3 and 4). The
investment in fixed-income assets was clearly different between plans that
offer company stock as an investment option and those that did not. For
both sets of plans, there was a negative relationship between earnings level
and investment in fixed-income assets, although it was much stronger in the
case of plans with company stock than in those without it (see Figure 4). The
combined effects of age and tenure reflected in Figure 5 was positive for
both sets ofplans, although it was somewhat more so for plans with company
stock.
In plans that provided an employer match in company stock (but the
employee was not constrained to put his or her own contributions in the
company stock fund), the percent of participant contributions to fixed-
income assets increased by 12 percent relative to plans where company stock
investment was totally voluntary. Among the plans that required the em-
ployee to contribute to the company stock fund in order to qualify for a
TABLE 6: Allocation of Contributions by Age and Earnings: Plans with Company Stock as an Investment Option (%)
AnnualEarnings ($000)
Age group 10.0-14.9 15.0-24.9 25.0-34.9 35.0-44.9 45.0-59.9 60.0-74.9 75.0-99.9 100+ AllEarnings
Percentage ofcontributions in company stock
20-29 26 23 28 37 36 34 17 12 28
30-39 40 30 32 37 38 37 37 30 35
40-49 44 31 33 39 41 41 39 39 37
50-59 41 30 32 39 46 48 44 42 39
60-65 39 28 30 37 39 35 31 28 33
All ages 38 28 31 38 41 41 39 38 35
Percentage ofcontributions in other equities
20-29 39 32 34 36 43 48 71 72 35
30-39 35 32 31 33 38 41 45 55 35
40-49 31 29 29 30 33 36 41 45 32
50-59 29 25 24 25 27 28 36 39 27
60-65 29 24 22 22 22 34 40 46 27
All ages 33 30 30 31 34 36 41 45 32
Percentage ofcontributions in fixed-income assets
20-29 35 45 38 27 21 18 12 16 37
30-39 25 38 37 30 24 22 18 15 31
40-49 25 40 38 31 26 22 21 16 31
50-59 30 45 44 36 27 24 20 19 34
60-65 32 48 48 41 39 31 29 26 41
All ages 29 42 39 31 25 23 20 17 33
Source: Authors' calculations. Allocations are calculated only for employees making a contribution in 1995. Plan information is from a file
containing data on 29 401 (k) plans that did provide the option of investing in company stock.
TABLE 7: Allocation of 401 (k) Contributions and Balances by Earnings (%)
AnnualEarnings ($000)
10.0-14.9 15.0-24.9 25.0-34.9 35.0-44.9 45.0-59.9 60.0-74.9 75.0-99.9 100+ All Earnings
Emplayerplans without company stock as an investment option
Contributions in equities
45 48 50 57 60 62 64 70 54
Balances in equities
47 48 50 57 60 63 65 71 53
Contributions in fixed-income assets
55 52 50 43 40 38 36 30 46
Balances in fixed-income assets
53 52 50 43 40 37 35 29 46
Emplayerplans with company stock as an investment option
Contributions in company stock
38 28 31 38 41 41 39 38 35
Balances in company stock
41 30 35 43 45 44 42 38 38
Contributions in other equities
33 30 30 31 34 36 41 45 32
Balances in other equities
33 30 30 30 32 34 38 43 32
Contributions in fixed-income assets
29 42 39 31 25 23 20 17 33
Balances in fixed-income assets
27 40 35 27 24 22 20 19 30
Source: See Table 1.
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Figure 4. Allocation of 401 (k) contributions to fixed-income assets by men byearn-
ings, for plans with and without company stock investment options (%). Values are
based on the Tobit estimates in columns 2 and 3, Appendix Table 3. Values are for
employees age 40 with 10 years of tenure. Intercepts should not be interpreted as
representing an average difference between plans with and without company stock.
CS/NCS refer to plans that respectively do or do not offer company stock as an
investment option.
match, participant contributions to fixed-income assets were reduced by 25
percent. In this latter case, it was clear that forcing employees to take com-
pany stock to qualify for a match caused participants to substitute out of
fixed-income assets.
Examining only plans that include company stock as an investment op-
tion, we estimated the allocation of participant contributions to company
stock and other equities. The relationship between earnings level and in-
vestment in both company stock and other equities was positive, although
somewhat less so in the case ofcompany stock. Estimates indicated that plan
requirements that a portion of 401 (k) contributions be invested in company
stock were successful in getting participants to invest funds in that fashion.
Our analysis indicated that the more restrictive the constraint, the more
effective it was in increasing the allocation to company stock. In the case of
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Figure 5. Allocation of 401 (k) contributions to fixed-income assets by men by age,
for plans with and without company stock investment (%). Values are based on the
Tobit estimates in columns 2 and 3, Appendix Table 3. Values are for employees
hired at age 30 with annual earnings of $40,000. Intercepts should not be inter-
preted as representing an average difference between plans with and without com-
pany stock. CS/NCS refer to plans that respectively do or do not offer company stock
as an investment option.
the other equities equation, it was clear that company stock constraints
pushed people out of other equity holdings.
Sex Differences in 401 (kJ Decisions
One area that is of particular interest to analysts of defined contribution
plans is the relative behavior ofmen and women. For example, several studies
based on a small number ofpension plans have reported that women demon-
strate greater risk aversion in allocating assets within their self-directed de-
fined contribution plans than men (Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei 1997; Hinz,
McCarthy, and Turner 1997), and that women are even less likely than men
to allocate wealth into defined contribution plans (jianakopolos, Bernasek,
and Bajtelsmit 1998). To shed some light on the relative participation and
investment behavior of men and women, we created a subfile ofworkers that
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includes the sex ofeach employee.9 Out ofthe original 156,376workers used
in the analysis, the sex was determined for 142,543. Of these, 46 percentwere
classified as female. The women were disproportionately represented in the
earnings categories below $35,000 per year, as were women in their 20s.
Our earlier analysis as well as research by others indicated that women
behave differently from men in deciding to participate in 401 (k) plans, in
the amount they contribute, and in the allocation of their pension funds.
Using our newly developed data file, we were able to examine the 401 (k)
choices of men and women in much more detail than previous studies had
done. Our findings indicated that women were not more reluctant 401 (k)
participants, and they did not seem to be more risk averse in investing their
self-directed defined contribution assets.
Sex Differences in 401 (k) Participation
A summary of participation rates by sex, age, and earnings categories is
presented in Table 8. In general, women were slightly more likely to partici-
pate (80 percent) in their companies' 401 (k) plans than men (78 percent).
A greater proportion of women participated in the plan in every age and
income category for workers with less than $60,000 per year. Of the 40
agel earnings categories shown in Table 8, the male participation rate ex-
ceeded the female rate in only eight categories, with four of these being for
workers with annual earnings in excess of$100,000 (shown in boldface).
One reason that women generally participated in 401 (k) plans more fre-
quently than men may relate to differences in household income. Our ad-
ministrative data did not include information on marital status of workers,
total household income, or the working status of spouses. But in an analysis
not reported in detail here we examined the March 1996 Current Popula-
tion Survey and found that working women were likely to be in families with
higher overall family income levels than working men with equivalent an-
nual earnings. 10
The difference in family income level between men and women at compa-
rable earnings levels means that some of the differential in how women
behave in 401 (k) plans compared to men may be a factor of variables we
cannot measure here. If the decisions about participating, contributing, or
investing in a 401 (k) plan were made on the basis of total resources available
to workers, viewing these factors on the basis ofearnings alone might be mis-
leading. For example, comparing working men and women at earnings lev-
els between $25,000 and $35,000, the women's mean family income tended
to be about $15,000 higher than for men. If 401 (k) usage is based on family
income instead of individual worker's earnings level, it suggests that we
should be comparing a woman with annual earnings of$25,000 in 1995 with
a man earning closer to $40,000 rather than one earning $25,000. Since we
do not know other family resources for workers in this analysis, we decided
TABLE 8: Participation Rates by Sex, Age, and Earnings (%)
AnnualEarnings ($000)
Age group 10.0-14.9 15.0-24.9 25.0-34.9 35.0-44.9 45.0-59.9 60.0-74.9 75.0-99.9 100+ All Earnings
Women
20-29 47.8 65.2 77.9 87.5 90.9 90.0 86.7 100.0 68.7
30-39 63.8 74.7 82.0 88.4 91.7 94.3 93.3 78.9 80.1
40-49 68.0 79.5 83.5 88.1 91.9 94.9 94.0 82.0 82.4
50-59 78.0 84.6 87.8 92.8 93.8 97.6 97.7 87.8 86.5
60-65 79.8 87.7 88.9 93.3 92.2 91.7 100.0 78.6 87.6
All ages 64.3 76.0 82.7 89.0 92.0 94.8 94.1 81.8 79.9
Men
20-29 34.1 56.1 64.6 76.4 85.3 92.4 93.6 84.6 63.8
30-39 49.3 65.9 72.1 77.8 86.2 90.7 93.8 91.4 77.7
40-49 53.4 67.1 73.4 78.2 84.5 89.3 91.5 90.1 80.2
50-59 62.1 73.8 75.8 81.1 86.0 92.2 94.6 92.5 83.4
60-65 69.2 70.2 71.3 82.0 89.9 97.0 92.2 93.3 82.3
All ages 48.8 64.6 71.4 78.3 85.6 90.7 92.9 91.2 77.7
Source: See Table 1.
Note: Entries for men in boldface show age and earnings cells where men's participation rate is greater than women's.
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Figure 6. 401 (k) participation rates by sex and earnings (%). Values are based on the
logit estimates in column 2, Appendix Table 5. Values are for employees of the
largest plan sponsor, age 40, with 10 years tenure.
that it would be most appropriate to estimate probability models of par-
ticipation, contributions, and account management separately for men and
women.
Sex differences in the decision to participate in a 401 (k) plan were ex-
amined by estimating separately the participation equation for men and
women (results are shown in Appendix Table 5). The estimates indicate that
age, tenure, and annual earnings were all important determinants of par-
ticipation for both men and women and that each of these effects was
nonlinear. Figure 6 shows the estimated effect of earnings by sex on 401 (k)
participation for hypothetical male and female workers age 40 with 10 years
of earnings. A somewhat surprising finding is that the probability of par-
ticipating in a 401 (k) plan was higher for women than for men, for annual
earnings in excess of $15,000. Furthermore, this difference widened at
higher levels of annual earnings. Women with earnings over $75,000 had a
probability of participating in the plan over 12 percentage points higher
than for men.
Patterns of participation also differed by sex and age (Figure 7). For
workers with earnings of$40,000 per year, the predicted probability of mak-
ing a 1995 contribution to the 401 (k) plan increased with age and tenure
for both men and women until the early 50s and then declined slightly.
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Among young workers, men were more likely to participate in their plans;
however, for persons over age 33, women had a higher probability ofpartici-
pation. The sex gap in participation reached 10 percentage points by age 50.
Sex Differences in 401 (kJ Contribution Rates
Another surprising result is that women contributed a higher proportion of
earnings to 401 (k) plans than did men with similar earnings. Average con-
tribution rates by age, sex, and earnings are shown in Table 9. These data
reveal an interesting pattern of agel earnings differences in contribution
rates by sex. The bold entries in the second halfof the table indicate that the
contribution rate for that agel earnings level was greater for men than for
women. Men at low earnings levels contributed a higher proportion of their
earnings than did women at similar earnings levels at all ages. Some of these
agel earnings differences in contribution rates were in excess of two per-
centage points of earnings. For workers with earnings in excess of $25,000,
men age 20 to 29 continued to contribute at higher levels than women;
however, for older workers, women contributed a greater proportion of
their annual pay.
Multivariate model ofcontribution rates was estimated separately for men
TABLE 9: 401 (k) Contribution Rates by Sex, Age, and Earnings (% ofAnnual Earnings)
AnnualEarnings ($000)
Age group 10.0-14.9 15.0-24.9 25.0-34.9 35.0-44.9 45.0-59.9 60.0-74.9 75.0-99.9 100+ AllEamings
--
Women
20-29 4.2 4.2 4.5 5.6 6.8 6.0 5.3 2.9 4.5
30-39 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.6 7.6 7.5 6.9 5.3 6.4
40-49 6.8 7.0 6.8 7.4 8.1 8.2 8.1 5.9 7.1
50-59 7.7 8.9 8.3 9.2 9.0 9.5 7.8 6.8 8.6
60-65 8.9 10.6 9.0 10.4 8.8 10.1 10.7 4.8 9.8
All ages 6.5 6.7 6.4 7.3 8.0 8.0 7.5 5.7 6.8
Men
20-29 4.7 5.1 5.4 6.3 7.0 7.3 5.4 4.8 5.7
30-39 7.7 6.9 6.1 6.4 7.1 7.4 7.2 5.4 6.7
40-49 10.3 8.3 6.4 6.5 7.0 7.4 7.2 5.8 6.9
50-59 10.8 9.8 7.7 7.5 8.1 8.3 7.6 6.0 7.9
60-65 11.6 10.2 9.0 8.4 9.1 8.7 7.6 5.7 8.7
All ages 8.6 7.3 6.3 6.6 7.3 7.6 7.3 5.8 6.9
Source: See Table 1.
Note: Entries for men in boldface show age and earnings cells where men's average contribution rate is greater than women's.
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Figure 8. 401 (k) contribution rates by sex and earnings (%). Values are based on the
OLS estimates in columns 2 and 4, Appendix Table 6. Values are for employees of the
largest plan sponsor, age 40, with 10 years tenure.
and women (Appendix Table 6), and the results are used to examine how
age and earnings affect differences in sex-specific contribution rates. Fig-
ure 8 shows that for workers age 40 with 10 years of tenure, the contribution
rate for women was greater than that for men for all but the lowest income
workers, and the difference widened as earnings increased. The estimated
effects indicated that with the exception of workers under age 33, working
women of all ages contributed a higher proportion of annual earnings to
their 401 (k) plan. Together with the findings concerning participation,
these effects indicated that women workers offered 401 (k) plans were at
least as active participants as men, controlling for differences in age, tenure,
earnings, and plan features. We next examined whether men and women
behaved differently in the investment of their 401 (k) contributions and
account balances.
Sex Differences in 401 (kJ Accumulations
An analysis of account balances by sex showed that men had larger account
balances than women. In our sample, men had balances of$24,880, or over
twice the size of the average female balance of$11,360. However, this obser-
TABLE 10: Average Account Balances by Sex, Age, and Earnings
AnnualEarnings ($000)
Age group 10.0-14.9 15.0-24.9 25.0-34.9 35.0-44.9 45.0-59.9 60.0-74.9 75.0-99.9 100+ AllEarnings
Women
20-29 1,246 2,025 3,259 6,377 9,012 13,893 10,087 8,153 3,074
30-39 2,608 4,122 7,038 11,832 18,002 25,736 30,527 36,294 9,146
40-49 3,893 5,890 10,041 17,910 27,521 40,444 48,644 58,644 13,786
50-59 4,937 9,219 16,336 28,287 39,795 53,001 62,161 99,353 17,377
60-65 6,374 12,564 21,289 34,374 53,487 64,274 78,379 72,657 19,853
All ages 3,430 5,493 9,173 16,301 24,672 35,422 42,473 53,983 11,360
Men
20-29 1,351 2,334 4,150 6,996 11,420 14,286 13,966 19,787 5,201
30-39 3,426 4,511 6,981 11,249 17,787 27,158 34,797 45,575 15,100
40-49 7,345 7,317 9,628 15,989 25,038 39,495 52,574 74,426 28,426
50-59 13,164 11,306 15,060 25,193 38,261 56,531 71,672 117,724 44,637
60-65 14,604 19,641 20,883 30,227 46,250 63,429 82,559 152,961 52,520
All ages 6,622 6,224 8,640 14,689 24,639 39,491 53,326 84,638 24,880
Source: See Table 1.
Note: Entries for men in boldface show age and earnings cells where men's average account balance is greater than women's.
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vation did not hold for all ages and earnings levels (see Table 10). Men's
balances were consistently larger than women's for workers in their 20s and
at the bottom and top of the earnings distributions. In the middle of the
earnings distribution, however, women had larger accumulated account
balances, and in some cases these differences were fairly large. One explana-
tion for men having larger account balances despite being less likely to
participate in the plan and having lower contribution rates may be that
older men had longer job tenure than similar aged women. The general
observation that men tended to have higher earnings than women will also
tend to produce higher 401 (k) account balances.
Sex Differences in 401 (k) Investments
Each of the 401 (k) plans in our sample required participants to make invest-
ment decisions. These choices were classified into fixed-income assets and
equities, and, as noted above, some plans also required that workers to de-
vote a portion of their holdings to the purchase of company stock. Table 11
illustrates several key findings. First, women devoted less of their contribu-
tions to the purchase ofcompany stock than did men, and they held a lower
percentage of their total account balances in company stock than did men
(29 percent compared to 45 percent). Women were also more likely to hold
fixed-income assets than men (40 percent compared to just over 25 per-
cent). This pattern of investment of 401 (k) accounts persisted for all age
groups.
Examining the account balances for men and women in the 58 plans that
did not have a company stock investment choice reveals a dramatically dif-
ferent picture (see Table 12). With the exception of young men at the low
and high tails of the earnings distribution, women generally held a higher
proportion of their 401 (k) assets in equities in plans not offering company
stock. These results suggested that previous findings that women tended
to devote a higher percentage of their retirement savings to low-risk/low-
return assets were wrong.
To further examine this issue, we estimated sex-specific equations for the
allocation of 1995 contributions and account balances separately for plans
with and without company stock investment options. In the first set of esti-
mates we looked at differences in the investment in fixed-income assets
(Appendix Tables 7 and 8). The results showed that, controlling for age and
tenure, there was a slightly negative relationship between earnings level and
share of401 (k) assets held in fixed-income assets in plans that did not have a
company stock option (Figure 9). This relationship was slightly more pro-
nounced for women than men, but still relatively moderate. The relation-
ship between earnings level and fixed-income asset holding was much more
pronounced in cases where the plan includes company stock as an invest-
ment option. In these plans, women were estimated to hold considerably
TABLE 11: Allocation of 401 (k) Contributions and Balances By Sex and Earnings: Plans with Company Stock as an
Investment Option (%)
Annual Earnings ($000)
Sex 10.0-14.9 15.0-24.9 25.0-34.9 35.0-44.9 45.0-59.9 60.0-74.9 75.0-99.9 100+ AllEarnings
Employee contributions in company stock
Women 25 25 26 30 32 29 28 27 27
Men 60 35 37 42 43 43 41 39 41
Employee contributions in other equities
Women 38 30 32 37 40 45 47 51 34
Men 25 31 28 28 33 35 40 45 32
Employee contributions in fixed-income assets
Women 36 45 42 32 27 26 25 22 39
Men 15 33 35 30 25 22 19 16 27
Employee-financed 401(k) balances in company stock
Women 26 26 28 34 36 30 31 27 29
Men 65 37 42 48 47 47 44 40 45
Employee-financed 401 (k) balances in other equities
Women 39 30 31 35 37 44 44 49 33
Men 24 33 29 28 30 33 37 42 31
Employee-financed 401(k) balances in fixed-income assets
Women 36 44 41 31 27 26 25 24 38
Men 12 30 29 25 22 21 19 18 24
Source: See Table 6.
TABLE 12: 401 (k) Account Balances Held in Equities by Sex, Age, and Earnings: Plans without Company Stock as an
Investment Option (%)
AnnualEarnings ($000)
Age group 10.0-14.9 15.0-24.9 25.0-34.9 35.0-44.9 45.0-59.9 60.0-74.9 75.0-99.9 100+ AllEarnings
Women
20-29 55 57 60 67 67 75 72 30 58
30-39 48 52 56 63 66 67 74 77 55
40-49 49 51 51 60 59 60 68 70 52
50-59 42 46 48 56 58 61 60 69 46
60-65 40 37 43 48 61 49 50 87 39
All ages 47 51 53 61 62 63 69 72 52
Men
20-29 58 46 57 64 70 72 83 84 57
30-39 50 45 51 59 63 68 72 78 59
40-49 47 39 39 53 57 60 63 71 54
50-59 39 31 32 44 49 54 57 64 46
60-65 32 23 28 41 40 56 50 61 40
All ages 48 40 46 55 59 62 64 71 54
Source: See Table 5.
Note: Entries for men in boldface type show age and earnings cells where men's average allocation of account balances to equities is greater
than women's.
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Figure 9, Allocation of 401 (k) contributions to fixed-income assets by sex and
whether the plan offers company stock as an investment option (% of total account
balances), Values are based on the Tobit estimates in columns 2 and 4, Appendix
Tables 7 and 8. Values are for employees age 40, with 10 years tenure. Intercepts
should not be interpreted as representing an average difference between plans with
and without company stock. CS/NCS refers to plans that respectively do or do not
offer company stock as an investment option.
more fixed-income assets than men and their holding of these assets was
more sensitive to earnings level than men's.
The estimated effects suggested that a requirement that the employee's
contributions be to company stock in order to qualify for a company match
had a roughly equivalent effect on men and women in reducing their overall
holding of fixed-income assets. When the employer match was in the form
ofcompany stock, but was not conditioned on the employee investing in this
form, both men and women were predicted to hold more fixed-income
assets at the mean. The estimated effect on men, however, was nearly 4.5
times as strong as for women.
Examining the effect of age on investment choices, we found that where
there was no company stock investmen t in the plan men and women tended
to invest in fixed-income assets in a very similar pattern at each age-tenure
combination, with there being an overall positive relationship between in-
vesting in this form and age. When company stock was part of the invest-
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Intercepts should not be interpreted as representing an avet'age difference between
plans with and without company stock.
ment portfolio, however, there was clearly some substitution of other assets
for fixed-income holdings and the substitution was clearly much stronger
for men than for women.
Estimates for equity and company stock holdings are reported in Appen-
dix Tables 9 and 10. For plans with company stock investment, the relation-
ship between earnings and investment behavior of men and women is inter-
esting (Figure 10). The earnings effect on company stock investment for
men was negligible - they were estimated to hold a relatively constant per-
centage of total assets in this form no matter what their earnings. Among
women, however, higher earners were willing to take on the greater risk of
company stock as compared to their counterparts further down the earn-
ings spectrum. The relationship between earnings and holding of other
equities was positive for both men and women, although it was slightly more
so for women than men. The combination of these findings suggested that
overall, women were somewhat more sensitive to investment risk across the
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earnings spectrum than men, and that the inclusion of company stock in
the 401 (k) portfolio increased that sensitivity.
Conclusion
This research confirms and extends previous research regarding American
workers' use of 401 (k) pension plans as retirement savings vehicles. We find
that 401 (k) plan participation is more age sensitive at lower earnings levels
than higher. Participation among workers earning $10,000-$15,000 per
year rises from 44 percent for those 20-29 to over 70 percent for those age
50 and older. In comparison, over 90 percent of all workers earning in
excess of $60,000 participate in 401 (k) plans regardless of age. We have
shown that given participation, age is more important in determining con-
tribution rates than earnings. Among those making a 401 (k) contribution
in 1995, the contribution rates of persons age 50 and older was over fifty
percent higher than that of workers 20-29 (over 8 percent of earnings
compared to 5 percent).
These patterns are consistent with earlier studies, as are our results that
older people tend to invest more conservatively than younger ones, and that
people with lower earnings invest more conservatively than more highly
paid workers. One finding that has not received prior study is that the
allocation of workers' current contributions to 401 (k) plans is remarkably
similar to the allocation of total assets in plans when controlling their age,
earnings levels, and sex. Our analysis also showed that the inclusion of
company stock as an investment option in the plans did influence how
people invested their 401 (k) assets and that it had a differential effect on the
patterns of investment of men and women. Women with relatively low earn-
ings who participated in plans with company stock requirements tended to
allocate about 10 percent less of their account balances to fixed-income
assets, while higher-earning women in plans with company stock require-
ments devoted over 20 percent less to fixed-income assets. In contrast, men
with low earnings held over 25 percent less in fixed-income assets while men
with higher earnings devoted almost 25 percent less to fixed-income assets.
One area we explored in detail pertains to differences between men and
women in their utilization of 401 (k) plans. We find that women behaved
differently from men in these plans and the differences were not just a
matter of degree. Specifically, women's participation rates increased more
steeply with increases in annual earnings, and with age and tenure, than did
men's. Women's contribution rates rose significantly with earnings, while
men's declined slightly. Furthermore, women's contributions rose more
steeply with age than did men's. Overall, we found that men had more
money in their plans than did women, but these sex differences may be
attributable to differences in their earnings, contribution rates, and job
tenure. We also found that women generally are not more conservative in
Making the Most of 401 'kJ Plans 127
their investment behavior than men after controlling for earnings, age, and
other important determinants of investment behavior. In general, we be-
lieve our results suggest that women are as effective in their use of 401 (k)
plans as their male counterparts. Beyond the youngest ages and lowest earn-
ings levels they participate and contribute at rates equal to or exceeding
those of men.
These findings have important implications for understanding national
retirement policy in the twenty-first century, and they provide new insights
into how workers make voluntary retirement savings decisions. Key insights
include:
1. When offered the option of participating in a voluntary 401 (k) plan,
most workers choose to make annual contributions.
2. The probability that workers make an annual contribution and the
amount of the contribution increase with age and earnings.
3. Women are equally (or more) likely than men to contribute to 401 (k)
plans.
4. Participants tend to have balanced portfolios, with about halfofcontri-
butions and account balances being devoted to equities and half to
fixed-income assets.
5. The proportion of balances and contributions allocated to equities
increases with annual earnings and declines with age.
6. In plans without company stock requirements, women hold as much
or more of their 401 (k) balances in equities than men. When company
stock requirements are imposed, men tend to hold a larger portion of
their assets in company stock.
These findings suggest that most workers will be able to adjust to the on-
going changes in private pensions - the continuing shift toward voluntary
defined contribution plans - by regularly contributing to their new pension
plans. Our analysis also indicates that further education of young workers
and those with low earnings is needed to insure that they begin saving early
enough and contribute sufficient funds to provide for an adequate retire-
ment income. Finally, these findings may provide some indication of how
workers would behave under a revised social security system that included
individual accounts. Our analysis indicates that most workers maintain di-
versified accounts and tend to move toward portfolios with less risk at older
ages. This should dispel some of the concerns associated with individual
accounts as a primary component of future national retirement policy.
Notes
1. To predict individual employee sex, we used a name recognition algorithm
described below.
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2. There has been some debate over the incidence offederal pension tax expendi-
tures. For different views of the incidence of the tax expenditures for employer
pensions, see Munnell (1991), Goodfellow and Schieber (1993), and Clark and
Wolper (1997).
3. This observation has important implications for understanding the role of
pensions in providing retirement income. Specifically, it is probable that more peo-
ple will accumulate retirement benefits than is indicated by cross-sectional participa-
tion rates. This higher career coverage rate by pensions implies that more workers
receive the advantage of pension tax expenditures than that implied by the cross-
sectional data. In particular, young, low-wage workers are likely to obtain pension
coverage later in their careers.
4. The probability of workers making a contribution to the their 401 (k) plan in
1995 is estimated using a logit procedure. Results from the logit estimation of the
probability of participation appear in the first two columns of Appendix Table l.
5. The statistical model estimates individual intercepts for the probability of par-
ticipation for each plan; however, the response to the other explanatory variables is
not a function of the plan which covers the worker. The largest plan sponsor in our
sample had a relatively low percentage of its employees participating in the 401 (k)
plan. As a result, the participation probabilities shown in Figures 1 and 2 are lower
than are estimated for most of the plans in the sample.
6. This variable was derived based on the benefit formula of the defined benefit
pension plan, projected growth in annual earnings, and the assumption that the
worker remains with the company until age 65. The company dummy variables were
not included in this equation, since these two variables were expected to capture
much of the variation in participation across the individual companies. These results
are shown in the last two columns ofAppendix Table l.
7. Contribution rates were estimated using ordinary least squares.
8. While 1995 participation in the plan was not a criterion for being included in
Table 4, the other screening criteria were still applied. That is, we still only included
workers earning $10,000 per year or more, those with one year of service or more,
and so forth.
9. Determination of the sex of employees was not straightforward because the
administrative records do not include a specific designation of the sex of the worker.
We had access to administrative employment records of another firm with similar
data on approximately 16,000 employees that included the individual plan partici-
pants' first names and an indicator of their sex. We sorted this file by first names and
tabulated the sex distributions with each name. We used the results of this exercise to
assign a sex classification to each individual in our sample. Any name where more
than 80 percent of the individuals with that name were of one sex was classified as
being a sex-specific name. All individuals with that name were assigned that sex. For
example, people with the name Ann were virtually always identified as females in our
source file. Thus, anyone in our sample with the name Ann was classified as a female.
In cases where a name did not include at least 80 percent persons of one sex, we
characterized that name as having an indeterminate sexual classification. For exam-
ple, names like Brett or Chris that are often associated with either men or women did
not meet our iden tification criterion. All individuals classified as being of indetermi-
nate sex on the analysis file were then visually reviewed for possible reclassification.
Where it was relatively clear to us that the name was associated with a man or woman,
it was reclassified accordingly.
10. Other than at the lowest earnings level, working men were consistently more
likely to be married than working women, but they were far more likely to be married
to a spouse who did not work outside the home for pay. Indeed, for working men
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earning more than $25,000 per year, the probability of having a wife who did not
work for pay increased with the husband's earnings. Almost 80 percent of married
women who work earn less than their husbands (Winkler 1998). This means that if
you compare a man and a woman at the same earnings level, each of whom has a
working spouse, it is likely that the woman will be in a household with higher total
earnings than the man. The man is likely to have a wife earning less than he is and
the woman is likely to have a husband earning more than she is. The lower proba-
bility of having a man having working spouse accen tuates the likelihood that men at
a given earnings level will end up in households with lower total income than women
with similar earnings levels. Controlling for earnings level, working women consis-
tently have higher average family incomes than their male counterparts at any given
earnings level.
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APPENDIx TABLE 1: Logit Estimates of Participation Rates in 401 (k) Plans
Marginal Standard Marginal Standard
Variable Effect Error Effect Error
INTERCEPT -0.47 0.11 -0.234 0.10
AGE 0.51 0.Ql 0.01 0.01
AGE SQUARED -0.19 0.01 -0.Ql 0.01
TENURE 0.20 0.003 0.01 0.003
TENURE SQUARED -0.07 0.00 -0.00 0.00
EARNINGS 0.15 0.004 0.03 0.004
EARNINGS SQUARED -0.004 0.001 -0.Ql 0.001
FEMALE" 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.01
SEX UNKNOWNa -0.001 0.02 0.02 0.02
COMPANY DUMM1ESb Yes No
MATCH RATE 0.03 0.02
REPLACEMENT RATE AT -0.04 0.04
AGE 65
Likelihood ratio chi-square 19,1976.32 8,346.79
N 156,009 152,914
Percent correctly predicted 74.5 67.3
McFadden's pseudo R-square 0.123 0.052
Sauree: Authors' estimates of the probability of employees' participation in the 401 (k) plan
using a Logit procedure.
" Equations include dichotomous variables indicating sex, if known, or whether this informa-
tion is missing.
b Estimates shown in column 2 include the effect of dichotomous variables indicating the
specific 401 (k) plan covering each employee. These variables are not included in the estimates
of marginal effects shown in column 4.
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APPENDIX TABLE 2: OLS Estimates of Percentage of Earnings Contributed to Plan
by Participants
Variable
INTERCEPT
AGE
AGE SQUARED
TENURE
TENURE SQUARED
EARNINGS
EARNINGS SQUARED
FEMALE"
SEX UNKNOWN"
COMPANYDUMMIESb
MATCH RATE
REPLACEMENT RATE AT
AGE 65
N
R-squared
Rbar-squared
F
Std. error ofestimate
Mmginal
Effect
0.06
-0.001
0.002
0.001
-0.003
-0.001
0.00
-0.003
0.001
Yes
122,511
0.37
0.37
758.41
0.06
Standard
Error
.003
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.001
Marginal
Effect
0.05
0.00
0.001
0.001
-0.01
-0.001
0.00
-0.003
-0.00
No
-0.03
0.02
120,010
0.05
0.05
598.80
0.07
Standard
Error
.003
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.001
.001
.001
Source: Authors' estimates of contribution rates for employees making a contribution to their
401 (k) plan using ordinary least squares.
a Equations include dichotomous variables indicating sex, if known, or whether this informa-
tion is missing.
b Estimates shown in column 2 include effect of dichotomous variables indicating the specific
401 (k) plan covering each employee. These variables are not included in the estimates shown
in column 4.
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APPENDIX TABLE 3: Tobit Estimates of Percentage of Participants' Contributions
Directed to Investments in Fixed Assets
Plans with Plans with
no company stock company stock
Marginal Standard Marginal Standard
Variable Effect Error Effect Error
INTERCEPT" 0.60 0.04 0.80 0.04
EMPLOYER MATCH IN -0.24 0.01
COMPANYSTOCK
CO STOCK INVESTMENT -1.09 0.002
REQUIRED FOR MATCH
AGE -0.17 0.02 -0.02 0.002
AGE SQUARED 0.02 0.002 0.03 0.002
TENURE 0.02 0.001 0.02 0.001
TENURE SQUARED -0.04 0.003 -0.03 0.003
EARNINGS -0.01 0.001 -0.03 0.001
EARNINGS SQUARED 0.003 0.00 0.01 0.00
FEMALEb 0.09 0.01 0.08 om
SEX UNKNOWNb 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01
COMPANYDUMMIESc Yes Yes
Uncensored 33,959 33,883
Right censored 11,491 7,418
Left censored 11,313 24,447
N 56,763 65,748
Source: Authors' estimates of the allocation of contributions to fixed-income assets using a Tobit
procedure.
• The intercept in column 4 is an average of three 401 (k) plans with omitted dummy variables.
b Equations include dichotomous variables indicating sex, if known, or whether this informa-
tion is missing.
c Estimates shown in columns 2 and 4 include the effect of dichotomous variables indicating
the specific 401 (k) plan covering each employee.
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APPENDIX TABLE 4: Tobit Estimates of Percentage of Participants' Contributions
Directed to Investment in Company Stock and Other Equities
by Participants in Plans with Company Stock
Company stock Other equities
Marginal Standard Marginal Standard
Variable Effect Error Effect Error
INTERCEPT" -0.29 0.03 0.20 0.04
EMPLOYER MATCH IN .58 0.01 -0.39 0.01
COMPANYSTOCK
CO STOCK INVESTMENT 1.22 0.01 -0.58 0.01
REQUIRED FOR MATCH
AGE 0.02 0.002 0.01 0.002
AGE SQUARED -0.02 0.002 -0.01 0.002
TENURE -0.05 0.001 -0.02 0.001
TENURE SQUARED 0.01 0.002 0.03 0.003
EARNINGS 0.002 0.001 0.03 0.001
EARNINGS SQUARED -0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.001
FEMALEb -0.03 0.004 -0.02 0.005
SEX UNKNOWNb -0.02 0.007 -0.04 0.008
COMPANYDUMM1ESc Yes Yes
Uncensored 33,681 39,176
Right censored 9,810 349
Left censored 22,257 26,223
N 65,748 65,748
Source: Authors' estimates of the allocation of contributions to company stock and other equi-
ties using a Tobit procedure.
a The intercepts are an average of three 401 (k) plans with omitted dummy variables.
b Equation include dichotomous variables indicating sex, if known, or whether this informa-
tion is missing.
C Estimates shown in columns 2 and 4 include the effect of dichotomous variables indicating
the specific 401 (k) plan covering each employee.
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APPENDIX TABLE 5: Logit Estimates of 401 (k) Plan Participation Rates for Men and
Women
Men Women
Marginal Standard Marginal Standard
Variable Effect Error Effect Error
INTERCEPT -0.39 0.16 -0.57 0.17
AGE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
AGE SQUARED -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
TENURE 0.01 0.004 0.03 0.01
TENURE SQUARED -0.00 0.00 -0.001 0.00
EARNINGS 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.01
EARNINGS SQUARED -0.01 0.002 -0.04 0.01
COMPANYDUMMIESa Yes Yes
Likelihood ratio chi-square 10,458.58 8,119.95
N 77,010 65,208
Percent correctly predicted 74.8 74.9
McFadden's pseudo R-square 0.13 0.12
Source: Authors' estimates of the probability by sex of employees' participation in the 401 (k)
plan using a Logit procedure.
a Estimates shown in columns 2 and 4 include the effect of dichotomous variables indicating
the specific 401 (k) plan covering each employee.
APPENDIX TABLE 6: OLS Estimates of Percentage of Earnings Contributed to Plan
by Participants for Men and Women Separately
Men Women
Marginal Standard Marginal Standard
Variable Effect Error Effect Error
INTERCEPT 0.06 0.004 0.06 0.01
AGE -0.001 0.00 -0.001 0.00
AGE SQUARED 0.002 0.00 0.003 0.00
TENURE 0.001 0.00 0.002 0.00
TENURE SQUARED -0.002 0.00 -0.01 0.00
EARNINGS -0.001 0.00 0.002 0.00
EARNINGS SQUARED 0.00 0.00 -0.001 0.00
COMPANYDUMMIESa Yes Yes
N 59,804 52,088
R-squared 0.32 0.41
Rbar-squared 0.32 0.41
F 308.30 395.37
Std. error of estimate 0.05 0.06
Source: Authors' estimates of contribution rates by sex for employees making a contribution to
their 401 (k) plan using ordinary least squares.
a Estimates shown in columns 2 and 4 include the effect of dichotomous variables indicating
the specific 401 (k) plan covering each employee.
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APPENDIX TABLE 7: Tobit Estimates of Percentage of Men's and Women's 401 (k)
Contributions Directed to Investments in Fixed-Income Assests:
Plans with Company Stock
Men Women
Marginal Standard Marginal Standard
Variable Effect Error Effect Error
INTERCEPT' 0.64 0.06 0.98 0.07
EMPLOYER MATCH IN -0.15 0.02 -0.40 0.03
COMPANYSTOCK
CO STOCK INVESTMENT -0.96 0.02 -1.26 0.02
REQUIRED FOR MATCH
AGE -0.02 0.003 -0.02 0.003
AGE SQUARED 0.03 0.003 0.02 0.004
TENURE 0.02 0.001 0.02 0.002
TENURE SQUARED -0.03 0.004 -0.03 0.01
EARNINGS -0.02 0.001 -0.06 0.003
EARNINGS SQUARED 0.01 0.001 0.10 0.01
COMPANYDUMMIESb Yes Yes
Uncensored 17,555 13,749
Right censored 2,610 4,177
Left censored 14,801 7,929
N 34,966 25,855
Source: Authors' estimates of the allocation by sex of account balances to fixed-income assets
using a Tobit procedure.
, The intercepts are an average of three 401 (k) plans with omitted dummy variables.
b Estimates shown in columns 2 and 4 include the effect of dichotomous variables indicating
the specific 401 (k) plan covering each employee.
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APPENDIX TABLE 8: Tobit Estimates of Percentage of Men's and Women's 401 (k)
Contributions Directed to Investments in Fixed-Income Assets:
Plans with No Company Stock
Men Women
Marginal Standard Marginal Standard
Variable Effect Error Effect Error
INTERCEPT 0.62 0.06 0.66 0.06
AGE -0.02 0.003 -0.01 0.003
AGE SQUARED 0.02 0.003 0.02 0.003
TENURE 0.02 0.001 0.02 0.002
TENURE SQUARED -0.03 0.004 -0.05 0.006
EARNINGS -0.01 0.001 -0.04 0.002
EARNINGS SQUARED 0.002 0.00 0.02 0.001
COMPANYDUMMIES' Yes Yes
Uncensored 15,161 15,434
Right censored 4,888 5,467
Left censored 4,789 5,332
N 24,838 26,233
Source: Authors' estimates of the allocation by sex of account balances to fixed-income assets
using a Tobit procedure.
a Estimates shown in columns 2 and 4 include the effect of dichotomous variables indicating
the specific 40 I (k) plan covering each employee.
Making the Most of 4011kJ Plans 137
APPENDIX TABLE 9: Tobit Estimates of Percentage of Men's and Women's 401 (k)
Balances Directed to Investments in Other Equities: Plans with
Company Stock
Men Women
Marginal Standard Marginal Standard
Variable Effect Error Effect Error
INTERCEPT" 0.34 0.05 0.08 0.06
EMPLOYER MATCH IN -0.45 0.02 -0.27 0.02
COMPANYSTOCK
CO STOCK INVESTMENT -0.60 0.01 -0.55 0.02
REQUIRED FOR MATCH
AGE 0.004 0.002 0.01 0.003
AGE SQUARED -0.009 0.003 -0.01 0.003
TENURE -0.01 0.001 -0.03 0.002
TENURE SQUARED 0.02 0.003 0.05 0.005
EARNINGS 0.03 0.001 0.06 0.003
EARNINGS SQUARED -0.02 0.001 -0.11 0.01
COMPANYDUMMIESb Yes Yes
Uncensored 20,522 15,917
Right censored 291 35
Left censored 14,153 9,903
N 34,966 25,855
Source: Authors' estimates of the allocation by sex of account balances to fixed-income assets
using a Tobit procedure.
a The intercepts are an average of three 401 (k) plans with omitted dwnmy variables.
b Estimates shown in columns 2 and 4 include the effect of dichotomous variables indicating
the specific 401 (k) plan covering each employee.
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APPENDIX TABLE 10: Tobit Estimates of Percentage of Men's and Women's 401 (k)
Balances Directed to Investments in Company Stock
Men Women
Marginal Standard Marginal Standard
Variable Effect Error Effect Error
INTERCEPT" -0.18 0.05 -0.42 0.04
EMPLOYER MATCH IN 0.56 0.02 0.62 0.02
COMPANYSTOCK
CO STOCK INVESTMENT 1.19 0.01 1.25 0.05
REQUIRED FOR MATCH
AGE 0.01 0.002 0.02 0.002
AGE SQUARED -0.02 0.003 -0.02 0.003
TENURE -0.01 0.001 -0.004 0.001
TENURE SQUARED 0.02 0.003 -0.025 0.004
EARNINGS 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.002
EARNINGS SQUARED -0.00 0.001 -0.01 0.01
COMPANYDUMMIESb Yes Yes
Uncensored 18,421 12,613
Right censored 6,649 2,403
Left censored 9,896 10,839
N 34,966 25,855
Source: Authors' estimates of the allocation by sex ofaccount balances to company stock using a
Tobit procedure.
a The intercepts are an average of three 401 (k) plans with omitted dummy variables.
b Estimates shown in columns 2 and 4 include the effect of dichotomous variables indicating
the specific 401 (k) plan covering each employee.
